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statutory provisions for such reservation, 4 and others holding that it is not
essential that the body in control of sales should be given express authoriza-
tion for the inclusion of the reservation. 5 Determination as to the existence
of this power necessarily involves the construction of the authorizing statute
to determine the legislative intent.
The final construction of a statute rests with the courts,0 but the con-
struction by the executive charged with the duty of execution is to be con-
sidered and given weight,7 especially when such construction is in accord with
previous decisions. 8  In the instant case an interpretation of the statute by
the State Land Departmerlt that such reservation was permissible was ap-
parently not in harmony with previous judicial decisions.0
It is desirable that the legislature in passing acts of this nature indicate
their intent with clarity for the intent of the legislature is to be ascertained
primarily from the language used in the statute. 10 It is illustrative that in a
recent Wyoming case, a statute reading, "the state shall convey title in fee
simple", was held not to establish that title to such land when sold must
include all minerals;" in a Colorado case the statute read approximately the
same, but it was held that the State Board of Land Commissioners had no
power to reserve the mineral rights in such conveyance and such reservation
was void.12
Since the instant case was decided, the Arizona legislature has attempted
to make their law more definite by the adoption of a statute providing for
proportionate reservation of mineral rights in all sales of state owned land.-I
The newly adopted statute is similar to that of North Dakota. 14
TED CAMRUD.
MONOPOLIES - SUPPRESSION OF COMPETITION - USE O THIRD PARTY
TECHNIQUE.- Defendants, a group of eastern railroads, engaged a public
relations firm for the purpose of creating public resentment against the long-
4. See Walpole v. State Land Com'rs., 62 Colo. 554, 163 Pac 848 (1917); Hugh v.
Thornton, 155 Minn. 432, 193 N.W. 723 (1923); State v. McKelvie, 111 Neb. 224, 196
N.W. 110 (1923).
5. See Terry v. Midwest Refiring Co., 64 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1933); State ex rel.
Otto v. Field, 31 N.M. 130, 241 Pac. 1027 (1925); State ex rel. Cross v. Board of
Land Com'rs, 50 Wyo. 184, 58 P.2d 423 (1946).
6. E. g., Twaits v. State Board of Equalization, 93 Cal. App. 2d 796, 210 P.2d 40,
42 (1949) (dictum).
7. See, e.g., State v. Davenport, 61 Ariz. 355, 149 P.2d 360 (1944).
8. See Prichard v. Southern Pac. Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 704, 51 P.2d 428 (1935).
9. See Campbell v. Flying V. Cattle Co., 25 Ariz. 557, 220 Pae. 417 (1923). The
state suggested that the instant case is not controlled by the earlier case, for the reason
that in the prior case the notice of sale did not recite that such reservation would be
made, but the Campbell case held it is immaterial that purchaser knew the patent con-
tained reservations, since the law did not authorize the state to impose such a condition
in making the sale.
10. See, e.g., Garrison v. Luke, 52 Ariz. 50, 78 P.2d 1120, 1122 (1938) (dictum).
See also State v. California Co. 56 N.W.2d 762 (N.D. 1953); Kopplin v. Burleigh County,
77 N.D. 942, 47 N.W.2d 137 (1951) (holding reservation of minerals by the county in
a deed after tax sale was invalid because of conflicting statutes).
11. State ex rel. Cross v. Board of Land Comm'rs., 50 Wyo. 181, 58 P.2d 423 (1953).
12. Walpole v. State Land Comm'rs., 62 Colo. 554, 163 Pac. 848 (1917).
13. Ariz. Rev. Stat..§ 37-231 (1957) "All sales, grants, deeds or patents to any
state lands shall be subject to and shall contain a reservation to the state of an un-
divided one-sixteenth of all oil, gases, -and other hydrocarbon substances, coal or stone,
metals, minerals,..."
14. N. D. Rev. Code § 38-0901 (1943) "In every transfer of land . . . by the
state of North Dakota . . . fifty per cent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals which may
be found on or underlying such land "hall be reserved to the state of North Dakota .
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haul trucking industry. The public relations firm paid (or created) various
organizations or engaged persons, who were apparently independent of the
controversy, to actively campaign against the truckers. The role of the rail-
roads was never disclosed to the public. This is known as the "third party
technique".' The public generally accepted the statements of these "inde-
pendent" third parties with the result that legislation unfavorable to the truck-
ing industry was enacted in several states. Plaintiffs, members of the long-
haul trucking industry, brought this action under the Sherman and Clayton
Anti-Trust Acts for conspiracy in restraint of trade. The defendants counter-
claimed alleging that the truckers had used the same technique against the
railroads. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants contended the other was
attempting to monopolize the long-haul business. The District Court held
that the concerted action of the railroads through the third party technique
was a conspiracy aimed directly at injuring the business of the truckers and
was, therefore, a conspiracy in restraint of trade under the anti-trust acts. As
the use of the technique by the truckers was aimed directly at helping their
own business, and only indirectly at injuring that of the railroads, their em-
ployment of the technique was legal. Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R.
Pres. Conf., 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Penn. 1957).
The use of the third party technique in business is not new. It is a well
known fact that the statements of "independent" parties are more persuasive
than are similar statements made by an interested party. Many groups and
persons attempt to take advantage of this fact by establishing secret relation-
ships with apparently disinterested third parties, who in return for tavors
will publicly aid and abet the cause for which their services have been pur-
chased. The legal implications of this technique are analagous to fraud. As
a false statement is not actionable unless a party relies and act upon it to his
damage .(it then becoming fraud),2 so also is the third party technique
actionable only when it can be collaterally attacked as designed to accomp-
lish an unlawful end.3 The employment of the technique in itself does not
create a liability in the user except where provided by statute. Thus, non-
disclosure of a "principle" through established registration procedures in-
1. The following are several examples of use of the "third party technique" by the
railroads in the instant case: (I) The officers of one organization were charged with
being in conspiracy with the railroads. They sent a letter to every editor in the state
denying the charge-the stationery and stamps were paid for by the railroads. (2)
Articles by distinguished authors were printed in Eeerybody's Digest, American Maga-
zine, Harper's, Reader's Digest, Saturday Evening Post, National Grange Monthly, Parade,
People, Country Gentleman, and others. Each of these articles condemned the trucking
industry. Each was authored by a "ghost writer" paid by the railroad, or, at best, based
upon statistics supplied by the railroads. (3) A New York clubwoman executive was paid
$13,000 in a short period of time.-to campaign against truckers. Wishing to have her
appear as an expert in the field of transportation, the public relations firm had a pamph-
let written which bore her name as authoress. (4) A retiring college professor, who it
was thought would "be very glad to have someone else do his research for him", was
provided with the "kit" of statistical information prepared by railroad heirlings. Un-
known to the professor, every speech, letter, or news release delivered in his name was
edited by the public relations firm, and on one occasion by a railroad official. (5) An
outstanding and apparently disinterested Princeton professor was chairman of a committee
which 'made recommendations to the Governor of 'New Jersey with respect to taxes in
the State. He worked closely with railroad men and was instrumental in gaining passage
of a weight-distance tax on.truckers. In none of the above instances was the part of the
railroads disclosed.
•.:1..:7 Restatement, Torts, 1 525 (1938).
. '3. r-;See United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 674
(E.D. W.1 1946), aW'd, 173 F.d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
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volves criminal aspects, regarding lobbyists,4 foreign controlled military and
political organizations,5 and all Communist "front" organizations.8 The Fed-
eral Communcations Commission also requires that broadcasting stations an-
nounce the name of any person or organization that pays, either directly or
indirectly, for a broadcast.7 In this manner it is presumably possible for the
public to obtain some degree of knowledge regarding the underwritcrs of
these various groups or individuals.
A business utilizing the technique in hfonest competition-toward a legal
end- without attempting to directly harm a competitor's business incurs no
liability.8 The end sought, or that 'which must necessarily result, must be
actionable. If the end result is the creation of a monopoly, the use of the
technique may be attacked as a violation of anti-trust statutes.9 In other
instances the use may create an actionable interference with prospective ad-
vantage,10 or it may be unfair competition."5 Another disadvantageous feat-
ure of the technique is the danger of running afoul of the Internal Revenue
Department. A business which takes a deduction for advertising or other
expense for the cost of a campaign of this nature runs the risk that such a
deduction would not be allowed as being an expenditure of money for an
illegal purpose. 1
2
It is apparent that if the technique is to be used effectively, the public
must remain ignorant of the true source of the information and propaganda
which is being disseminated. The public, however, is entitled to know the
true supplier of such information in order that they may make intelligent
appraisals of vital subjects, and may know when material put before them is
biased. As one judge pointed out, "[T]he only conceivable reason for
anonymity of political broadcasting" (or for that matter any dissemination of
information) "is a purpose of deception, and that purpose is enough to vali-
date a requirement of identification."3 It appears that the public interest
demands that a legislative attempt be made to relieve some of the more
flagrant abuses of the technique as represented by this case.
MICII.L E. MILLER.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - TORTS - LLBELrrY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN Ex-
ERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. - Plaintiff's husband was jailed for
drunkeness and died of suffocation as a result of a fire during the absence
of the jailer. In an action for wrongful death against the city, the Supreme
4. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 841, 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1952).
5. 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (B) (1) (1952); 52 Stat. 632 (1938),
22 U.S.C. § 612 (1952).
6. Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (b) (1952).
7. 48 Stat. 1089 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1952).
8. It must be understood, however, that where a combination is formed it is the
actual result which governs and not the intent of the parties forming that combination.
See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
9. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
10. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Pommer, 199 Fed. 309 (N.D. N. Y. 1912).
11. Even though not amounting.to legal fraud. Cf. Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
12. Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
855 (1930).
13. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223
F.2d 531, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd for other reasons, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
